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Two experiments investigated the proposition that the amount of cognitive effort expended
to encode information will be directly related to recall of that information. While previous
research has shown that amount of processing may affect recall, these studies have generally
drawn on the notion of an elaborated memory representation to explain their results. In this
study, the amount of processing required to correctly interpret anaphoric relations was varied
while the elaboration of the memory trace was held constant. These experiments employed a
self-paced reading paradigm in which subjects read a series of short paragraphs and later were
cued to recall the final sentence of each paragraph. It was found that recall was significantly
improved when more processing was required to correctly interpret the anaphoric relationship
expressed in the final sentence. These findings suggest that encoding processes can affect recall
performance without elaboration of the memory representation.
Although the original formulation of the levels-of-
processing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) has
been the subject of considerable criticism (see Baddeley,
1978; Nelson, 1977), revised versions of the model have
been proposed that attribute differences in recall to
various encoding activities. These versions can generally
be divided into two groups. The elaboration model,
proposed by Anderson and his colleagues (Anderson &
Reder, 1979), claims that deeper processing at encoding
results in the creation of a set of multiple propositions
that facilitate recall of the information. The distinc-
tiveness theory, advanced by Jacoby (Jacoby & Craik,
1979; Jacoby, Craik, & Begg, 1979), predicts that
deeper processing at encoding results in a more distinct
memory representation that has a greater probability
of being recalled at time of retrieval. In the present
article, both of these models will be outlined and the
results of two experiments will be reported that test
the adequacy of the models to account for differences
in the retention of prose.
The elaboration model, as proposed by Anderson
and Reder (1979), suggests that different encoding
processes result in more or less elaborated memory
traces. Passages or sentences vary in the degree to which
they encourage readers to draw inferences about conse-
quences, causes, or outcomes. When the reader is able to
draw an inference, the inferred information is stored
along with the explicitly stated information. The storage
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of inferred and explicit information results in an elabo-
rated memory trace. The degree to which a passage or
sentence is elaborated upon depends in part on task
demands, readers' prior knowledge, and other nontextual
factors. Bradshaw and Anderson (1982) suggest that
elaborated traces are more easily recalled for two reasons.
First, the presence of an elaborated trace results in more
network redundancy in memory. When there is a great
deal of redundancy in a memory trace, the possibility
for alternative paths in memory to reach the information
is enhanced. The second possibility is called inferential
redundancy. The availability of additional information
within the memory trace enhances the reader's ability
to retrieve the elaborated material and therefore to infer
or reconstruct the to-be-remembered information.
Bradshaw and Anderson state that reconstruction of the
material can occur even if the specific material is inacces-
sible at the time of retrieval.
In support of their theory of elaborative processes
in memory, Bradshaw and Anderson (1982) compared
the recall of specific information presented in three
different contexts. The first context, called the single-
sentence context, presented a piece of information
about a famous person. The second context, called the
unrelated context, presented that same sentence in addi-
tion to two other pieces of information about that
person. However, these two pieces of information
were not specifically related to the information given in
the single target sentence. The third condition, the
related condition. again presented the target sentence
about the person, but it also provided two sentences
that allowed the reader to infer the specific information
presented in the target sentence. The additional sen-
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tences either provided the cause or stated the conse-
quences of the information contained in the target
sentence. Using cued recall tasks, Bradshaw and Anderson
(1982) found recall performances that supported their
hypothesis. The related condition produced the highest
level of recall for the target sentence. The unrelated
sentence condition produced the lowest level of recall
performance, with the single-sentence condition being
significantly different from both. While these results
certainly offer strong support of Anderson and Reder's
(1979) position concerning the facilitative effect of
elaboration on recall performance, they do not preclude
the possibility that processes other than elaboration
could enhance recall. Elaboration theory, although
based on differences in processing at time of encoding,
assumes that recall differences are due to different
structures present in memory.
A second group of theories that seeks to explain the
effects of encoding processes on later recall support
the distinctiveness model. This model, advocated pri-
marily by Jacoby (Jacoby & Craik, 1979; Jacoby et al.,
1979), suggests that improved recall performance may
be due to processing differences that occur at encoding
but do not require different memory traces. Proponents
of this model argue that differences in recall perfor-
mance are due to varying levels of distinctiveness for a
particular memory trace rather than the presence of
additional information stored in memory. The analogy
of perceptual distinctiveness is useful in clarifying this
theoretical claim. If an item is stored in a background
such that a great deal of contrast between the item and
its background is evident, the item should be recog-
nized or perceived more readily. Jacoby and his col-
leagues maintain that similar processes occur in memory.
If a piece of information is stored in memory and is
distinctive or different from the information stored
with it, that information will be more accessible at the
time of retrieval. If, however, the information is stored
with related information and, therefore, is less distinct,
the probability of that particular piece of information
being recalled will be low.
One problem with this theory, similar to the major
criticism of the depth-of-processing model (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972), is the difficulties involved in obtaining
an independent measure of distinctiveness or depth.
Several variables that have been proposed, such as time,
have been found to be inadequate measures of strength,
effort, or in this case, distinctiveness.
Some previous research has sought to identify cogni-
tive effort as a measure of distinctiveness or depth of
processing (Johnson-Laird & Bethell-Fox, 1978 ;Johnson-
Laird, Gibbs, & deMowbray, 1978; Tyler, Hertel,
McCallum, & Ellis, 1979). In these experiments, Johnson-
Laird and others have attempted to show that the
number of processes engaged in while encoding infonna-
tion affects the accessibility of that information in
long-term memory. Johnson-Laird and Bethell-Fox
(1978) reported that subjects' recall of a question
depended, in part, upon the difficulty level of the ques-
tion. The more difficulty subjects experienced in arriv-
ing at an answer, the better was the recall of that ques-
tion. These researchers hypothesized that the recall
advantage noted for the more difficult questions was due
to the extra processing involved in arriving at either a
"yes" or "no" response to these questions.
While the work of Johnson-Laird and his colleagues
(Johnson-Laird & Bethell-Fox, 1978; Johnson-Laird
et al., 1978) does show that extra processing increases
the probability of correct recall, their work does not
prove that the increased recall is due to the extra pro-
cessing per se. Their results easily could be explained by
assuming that the extra processing resulted in a more
elaborated memory trace. To determine which of these
explanations is correct, a procedure would have to be
used that varies the amount of processing while holding
constant the elaborateness of the memory trace.
We are proposing that Johnson-Laird and Bethell-
Fox's (1978) formulation regarding the number of steps
involved in processing information is a valid measure of
how distinctive the memory trace of that information
will be. In order to test this assumption, we will borrow
from the work of Haviland and Clark (1974). Haviland
and Clark, along with numerous other researchers
(e.g., Garrod & Sanford, 1977; Yekovich & Walker,
1978; Yekovich, Walker, & Blackman, 1979) have postu-
lated the processes readers must go through to calculate
anaphoric relations. For example, if we take the two
sentences (1) Bill ordered the spaghetti, and (2) The
spaghetti tasted delicious, it is easy for readers to estab-
lish that the spaghetti mentioned in the second sentence
is the same spaghetti as that mentioned in the first
sentence. Clark (1977) says that (1) this process is
guided by syntactic cues, such as the use of the specific
article "the," and (2) because it is a simple, direct match
from spaghetti as new information in the first sentence
to spaghetti as old information in the second sentence,
it is easy for readers to link the information in the first
sentence to that in the second sentence and store both
sentences in memory. However, if we change the first
sentence in the above example to (1 a) Bill ordered the
food, a more complicated procedure must be followed
for readers to connect the item "spaghetti" with its
referent "food." In this instance, Clark states that
readers must build a bridging structure that allows them
to infer that the "spaghetti" mentioned in the second
sentence is the "food" referred to in the earlier sentence.
Haviland and Clark (1974) found that it takes longer
for one to read the last sentence "The spaghetti tastes
delicious" when it has been preceded by a sentence
containing an indirect referent (e.g., "food") than when
it has been preceded by a sentence containing a direct
referent (e.g., "spaghetti"). This finding is well sup-
ported by other researchers (Clark & Sengul, 1979;
Yekovich & Walker, 1978). .
When one reads the above example, whether the
first sentence contains a direct or an indirect referent,
the memory representation will be very similar in terms
of propositions. That is, although there is a one-word
discrepancy between the two examples (food or spa-
ghetti), the propositional representation in memory will
be stored in terms of the direct referent. Thus, the pro-
cedure of calculating referents appears to provide an
ideal test for investigating the validity of the distinc-
tiveness hypothesis as it pertains to encoding activities.
Using sentence passages similar to those developed by
Haviland and Clark (1974), we will be able to systemati-
cally manipulate the amount of processing readers must
perform to comprehend a fmal sentence by varying
whether the referent in the previous sentence is a direct
referent or an indirect referent.
This procedure will enable us to control a critical
factor that Bradshaw and Anderson (1982) did not
control for in their experiments. In their research, no
attempt was made to hold constant the memory repre-
sentations across conditions. That, of course, must be
the case if one is hypothesizing elaboration as the sole
reason for increased recall performance. In this study,
we will systematically vary the amount of processing
involved in reading a short passage, while maintaining a
rough equality in terms of the elaborateness of the
memory representations for the two conditions. In this
manner, we should be able to test the assumption that
different amounts or types of encoding processes affect
the accessibility of information at the time of retrieval.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of this study is to determine the applica-
bility of these earlier findings to a reader's memory for
prose. We will use the general paradigm of Haviland and
Clark (1974) to discover if the processing differences
caused by variations of anaphoric relations in text are
reflected in differences in recall. A series of prose
passages will be presented to subjects in which the type
of referent is systematically varied. Again, it has been
shown that when an item mentioned in text has an
indirect (nonidentical) referent, it takes longer to com-
prehend than when the item has been preceded by a
direct (identical) referent. This increase in reading time
is believed to be due to the reader's need to build a
bridging inference connecting an item to its indirect
referent, or to relabel the individual in memory, or both.
Through the use of these procedures, we will vary the
processes used during the encoding of the text. A recall
task will then be used to ascertain whether differences
in processing at the time of encoding will be reflected
in different levels of retention.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 24 graduate students of educa-
tion currently enrolled at Teachers College, Columbia Univer-
sity. Subjects were paid $5 for participating in the study. One
subject who failed to follow instructions was eliminated from
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the subject pool and replaced by another recruited from the
same population.
Materials. Thirty three-sentence passages were created for use
in the experiment. The first and third sentences of a particular
set were identical for each condition. The first sentence of each
passage served as an introduction. The third sentence of each
passage made a statement about the target item mentioned in
the second sentence.
The second sentence differed for each of three conditions.
The second sentence in the direct referent condition contained
the specific target item that would be repeated in the third
sentence. In the indirect referent condition, a general item was
introduced in the second sentence. The second sentence in the
no-referent condition contained information germane to the
general topic of the discourse without mentioning either the
specific or general target item. The following are examples of
passages representing the three conditions. Sentence 1: The
restaurant was quite crowded today. Sentence 2 (direct condi-
tion): One customer ordered a plate of spaghetti. Sentence 2
(indirect condition): One customer ordered a plate of food for
his dinner. Sentence 2 (no-referent condition): Many customers
had to wait before being served. Sentence 3: The spaghetti
was quite delicious.
Counterbalancing of the stimulus passages was achieved by
devising three orders such that one-third of the passagesappeared
under each condition. Thus there were 10 passages from each
condition in each list.
Design and Procedure. Subjects were tested individually.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three test lists. The
30 stimulus passages plus two practice stories were presented
to the subjects one sentence at a time on a video monitor. All
stimulus sentences were presented in the middle of the screen in
uppercase letters. Subjects were told that in order to view a
sentence, they would have to press the space bar on the Radio
Shack TRS-80 microcomputer keyboard. They were told that
as soon as they had read and understood the sentence, they
were to press the space bar to receive a new sentence. A sentence
informing the subjects that they had read the last sentence of a
story appeared at the end of each passage. The microprocessor
randomized passage presentation order and recorded reading
times in milliseconds for each stimulus sentence.
After subjects had read all 30 passages, a statement signaling
the onset of the cued recall task appeared on the screen. Sub-
jects were informed that they would be cued with the first
sentence of each story. Subjects were instructed to write down
on a piece of paper whatever they could remember about the
final sentence of that story. The presentation order of the
sentence cues matched the presentation order of the stimulus
passages. Subjects were asked to work at their own pace during
the cued recall task and to press the space bar on the keyboard
to receive a new cue.
The cued recall data were scored for the presence of the
target item and for gist recall of the third sentence. One point
was awarded for each target item mentioned. Subjects were
credited one point for gist recall if their response reflected the
general meaning of the third sentence. Protocols that contained
errors in tense, pronoun usage, or target item specificity were
not marked incorrect as long as the general meaning of the
sentence was maintained. The recall protocols were scored
independently by two judges. The interrater reliabilities ranged
from .87 to .95 for the three conditions. Discrepancies in scoring
were settled by agreement of the two judges.
Reading times were adjusted in two ways before they were
subjected to analysis. First, all extreme latencies longer than
7 sec were replaced; second, all latencies over 2.5 standard devia-
tions from the subject's mean of each of the three conditions
were replaced. Approximately 1% of the latencies were replaced
following the procedure recommended by Winer (1971, p. 487).
Results and Discussion
Table I presents means and standard deviations of
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Table I
Mean Reading Time (in Milliseconds) and Proportion Correct
Recall of the Last Sentences in Experiment I
reading times and recall scores for all conditions. A one-
way, within-subjects, repeated-measures analysis of
variance revealed a significant effect for condition
[F(2,46) =7.93, P < .001]. Tukeya comparisons indi-
cated a significant reading time advantage for direct
passages as compared to indirect or no-referent passages.
The cued recall data, which constituted the depen-
dent variable of primary interest, were scored for the
presence or absence of the target item and for the gist
recall of the third sentence. Table 1 contains summary
statistics for the cued recall task by condition. An
analysis of variance of target item recall indicated
a significant effect for condition [F(2,46) =3.58,
p < .05]. Tukeya comparisons revealed a significant
recall advantage for the indirect condition contrasted
with the direct referent and the no-referent conditions
(p < .05). An analysis of variance was performed on
the number of target items mentioned for each passage
in each condition. The analysis yielded a nonsignificant F.
The gist recall results of the first experiment seem to
provide very strong support for the position that quali-
tative differences in the memory trace affect recall
performance. If one goes back to the example of direct
and indirect passage types, it seems clear that more
elaborated traces do not exist for the indirect passages.
If one assumes that the memory trace for the passages
is in the form of interconnected propositions (e.g.,
Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978), there seems to be no way in
which the recall results could be explained in terms of
elaboration theory, for the propositional structure of
the direct and indirect passages would differ only in the
labeling of an element in a single proposition. However,
three possible explanations do exist that could fit both
these results and the elaboration theory.
The first is that higher recall in the indirect condi-
tion was due to more time being spent in reading (rehears-
ing) the last sentence. This explanation, although appeal-
ing in its simplicity, was tested for by the inclusion
of the no-referent condition. Passages in the no-referent
condition had the longest reading times for the target
sentence, yet the recall performance was lowest in this
condition. This pattern of results seems to eliminate a
simple reading time/recall performance relationship.
The second possibility is that when a reader is required
to make a bridging inference to correctly interpret an
anaphoric relationship, this inference is stored along
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1562 540 1696 483 1779 554
.280 .190 .382 .232 .274 .217
with the representation of the paragraph. If this is the
case, then there would be a more elaborated memory
representation for the paragraphs in the indirect referent
condition.
The final way in which these results could be made to
fit with an elaborated trace theory would be to assume a
different structure in the memory representation of the
passages. Earlier, we noted that if the passages were
represented by a propositional chain there would be no
real differences in the two memory traces. If, however,
the memory traces of the passages were based upon the
storage of main items or individuals (such as the theory
suggested by Anderson & Hastie, 1974, and Garrod &
Sanford, 1977), the results of the first experiment
could be explained in terms of an elaborated memory
trace.
Both Anderson and Hastie (1974) and Garrod and
Sanford (1977) suggest that the information is stored in
terms of the referential label that most specifically
identifies the "individual." For example, if one reads
the two sentences (1) The child was walking down the
street, and (2) The little boy was obviously going home,
after reading the first sentence, the information would
be stored in terms of the "individual" labeled "child."
Upon reading the second sentence, however, the new
and old information would be stored in terms of the
same individual but with a new, more specific label,
"boy."
According to this system, in order for additional
information to be stored in an individual location, it
would have to be checked against the label "boy."
Likewise, if one read (1) The boy was walking down
the street, and (2) The boy was obviously going home,
the memory representation would be centered around
the individual labeled "boy." The difference in process-
ing between these two sets of sentences would be the
type of processing that occurred in arriving at the same
memory representation. In the first instance, the reader
will relabel the memory location, changing it from the
general label "child" to the specific label "boy." In the
second instance, no relabeling will occur; the specific
label "boy" is used in both sentences. According to this
theory of the memory representation of prose, the
indirect passages used in the first experiment would have
a slightly more elaborated memory trace.
While the use of elaboration theory to explain these
results is possible, it is problematic. This explanation
requires that a relatively small amount of "elaboration"
must lead to a rather large increase (in this experiment,
to more than a 25% increase) in recall performance.
To check the validity of the first explanation above, a
new factor was introduced in the second experiment.
This factor was intended to eliminate any difference in
memory representations of the text, while systematically
varying the amount of processing required.
"Distance" will be the new factor used in the next







assumed to be given and its referent has been found to
affect processing during reading. Work by both Clark
and Sengul (1979) and Garrod and Sanford (1977)
has shown that it takes longer to comprehend a sentence
when it refers to a referent mentioned two sentences
previously than when it refers to a referent mentioned
only one sentence previously. Clark and Sengul (1979)
theorized that this was due to the fact that items one
sentence back are in a privileged position in memory.
Clark and Sengul (1979) have explained this increase
in reading time when the item is more than one sentence
back in a passage by drawing upon Jarvella's (1971)
discontinuity model. This discontinuity model is based
on a theory of how much information a reader can
actively deal with at anyone time. In this model, the
reader is able to actively handle the information pre-
sented in any given sentence, plus the information pre-
sented in the immediately previous sentence or clause.
Therefore, any information presented in the immedi-
ately previous sentence is easily integrated with the
information in the present sentence, either by direct
matching or by building a bridging inference. If, how-
ever, information is not in the preceding sentence or
clause but is several sentences back, it is no longer as
easily connected by the reader to the current sentence.
Thus, when one must find a referent that is no longer in
a privileged memory location, an extra amount of pro-
cessing must occur. This processing involves searching
for and retrieving the referent from the memory repre-
sentation of the paragraph. Clark and Sengul (1979)
use this model to explain why it takes longer to compre-
hend a sentence when it refers to information that has
been presented more than one sentence earlier. By
varying the distance between a noun and its referent, we
should be able to vary the amount of processing while
eliminating any difference in the elaborateness of the
memory representation. When a direct referent is no
longer in a privileged memory location, an extra pro-
cessing step will occur. However, no bridging inference
will need to be made, nor will there be any differences in
the wording of the paragraphs. The only difference that
could exist between the memory representations of the
paragraphs would be in terms of the ordering of proposi-
tions. The elaboration theory would clearly predict no
recall differences due to distance between a noun and
its referent. By introducing this new variable, distance,
in the second experiment, a further test was made for
the effects of qualitatively different encoding processes
on recall performance.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was basically a replication of the first
experiment. The new variable, distance, was introduced
to determine if the recall results of the first experi-
ment could be replicated and to determine if encoding
differences that did not result in different memory
traces would also be reflected by differences in recall
performance.
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Although this experiment orthogonally varied refer-
ent type (direct, indirect) and referent distance (near,
far), the comparison of primary importance is between
the recall levels of the sentences in the direct-near
condition and the direct- far condition. It is within these
two conditions that the amount of elaboration has been
controlled for and the necessary encoding processes have
been varied. It is hypothesized that recall of the target
sentence will be higher in the direct-far than in the
direct-near condition.
Method
SUbjects. The subjects were 40 graduate students of educa-
tion enrolled at Teachers College, Columbia University. Sub-
jects were either paid $5 for participating in the study or did so
in order to fulfill a course requirement.
Materials. Forty four-sentence passages were created for use
in the experiment. As in the first experiment, the first sentence
always introduced a general topic and the last sentence used the
target item as the subject of the sentence. The second and third
sentences varied to create the four conditions. As in the first
experiment, referent condition varied depending upon whether
a general label or a specific label was used to precede the target
item. Distance was varied by either placing the referent in
the third sentence (near condition) or in the second sentence
(far condition). The following are examples of passages repre-
senting the four conditions. Sentence I (all conditions): Bill
was on his way to the store. Sentence 2 (near conditions): The
streets were crowded with shoppers. Sentence 2 (direct-far): A
truck ran through the red light. Sentence 2 (indirect-far): A vehicle
ran through the red light. Sentence 3 (direct-near): A truck ran
through the red light. Sentence 3 (indirect-near): A vehicle
ran through the red light. Sentence 3 (far conditions): The
streets were crowded with shoppers. Sentence 4 (all conditions):
The truck hit a man in the crosswalk.
A direct-near passage had a sentence that was context related
but did not mention the critical item in the second sentence
slot. The third sentence in this condition introduced the specific
item that would be repeated in the fourth sentence. Direct-far
passages contained the same four sentences as the direct-near
condition. However, the order of the second and third sentences
was reversed. Increasing the distance between the target sentence
and its referent was achieved by placing a filler sentence between
the appearance of the specific target item in the second sentence
and the reiteration of the target item in the fourth sentence.
An indirect-near passage resembled its direct counterpart
with the exception that the third sentence introduced a general
item instead of a specific item. An indirect-far passage was
created by reversing the order of the second and third sentences
of the indirect-near version. Passages were counterbalanced
across conditions, and each subject read 10 passages from each
of the four conditions.
Design and Procedures. Subjects were tested individually.
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of four stimulus
lists. The procedures employed in this experiment were identical
to those used in the first experiment. The experiment utilized a
2 by 2 within-subjects design, with referent type (direct-indirect)
and distance (near-far) as the two factors.
Scoring of the cued recall task followed the same criteria
employed in the first experiment. The interrater reliabilities
between the two judges' scoring of the gist recall data ranged
from .89 to .97 for the four conditions.
Results and Discussion
Means and standard deviations of reading times and
recall performance are presented in Table 2. A two-way
analysis of variance of the mean latencies revealed a
significant main effect for referent type only [F( 1,39) =
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Table 2
Mean Reading Time (in Milliseconds), Proportion Correct Recall of the Last Sentences,
and the Correlation Between Time and Recall in Experiment 2
Condition
Direct-Near Direct-Far Indirect-Near Indirect-Far
Measure Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Reading Time 1552 519 1588 540 1690 552 1721 578
Correct Recall .285 .210 .345 .250 .345 .228 .303 .230
Correlation .098 .274* .304 .028 .253 .057 .320 .022
"Significance level.
27.08, p < .001]. The interaction between factors was
not significant [F(1 ,39) = .05] .
A two-way analysis of variance revealed no significant
main effects, but a significant interaction between refer-
ent type and referent distance was observed [F(1 ,46) =
6.75, p < .05]. Follow-up analyses confirmed our
hypothesis by revealing that both the direct-far and the
indirect-near conditions led to significantly (p < .05)
higher levels of recall than did the direct-near condition.
The number of target items mentioned for each condi-
tion was also subjected to an analysis of variance, which
revealed no significant main effects for referent type
[F(1,39)=.14], distance [F(1,39)=.06], or their
interaction [F( 1,39) = .20] .
Table 2 also presents product-moment correlations
between reading times and cued recall performance on
the target sentences by condition. Recall of the fourth
sentences was positively related to reading times in both
far conditions and marginally related in the indirect-near
condition.
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 demonstrated that
subjects took longer to read a sentence in the indirect
referent condition than in the direct referent condition.
What was unexpected was the failure to find a main
effect for distance on reading time. Given the findings of
Clark and Sengul (1979), it is somewhat surprising that
the distance between an item and its referent seemed to
have little effect on processing time. However, closer
examination of the experiments of Clark and Sengul
revealed a high variability across experiments in terms of
the amount of increased reading time due to referent
distance. Also, there were several procedural differences
(sentence length, presentation style) that may have
accounted for the failure to find a significant main effect
for distance. Given these drawbacks, it should be noted
that there was a fairly consistent time difference for
distance in both the direct and indirect referent condi-
tions (36 and 31 msec).
The recall findings for the indirect-far condition were
also unexpected in light of a cognitive effort approach
to the explanation of qualitative encoding differences. It
had been expected that the direct-far and indirect-near
sentences would be recalled more successfully than
direct-near sentences, and this expectation was upheld
by the results. However, it was also expected that the
indirect-far sentences would be recalled at least as
successfully as the direct-far and indirect-near sentences,
because they would be expected to demand the most
processing on the part of the reader. The findings,
however, show that the recall performance for indirect-
far sentences fell between that of the direct-near sen-
tences and the direct-far and indirect-near sentences.
How can these findings be explained? One possible
explanation rests on the notion of a "blow-out" effect.
This notion suggests that in the indirect-far condition
the reader had to search for information in long-term
memory and draw a bridging inference in order to
correctly integrate the information. The processing
demands were very large. In addition, it should be noted
that the indirect-far condition violates standard rules
concerning the relative locations in the text of a given
item and its referent; for example, reading "The truck"
at the start of the target sentence (note the earlier
example) forces the reader to presuppose that there is a
referent, but that referent was not available as expected
in the preceding sentence. Thus the reader must either
expend a great deal of cognitive effort to calculate the
correct referent, or, as Haviland and Clark (1974)
theorized, the reader can simply treat "The truck" as
new information.
The intermediate level of recall performance under
the indirect-far condition could thus be explained by the
fact that readers were sometimes able to handle this
double processing load and correctly integrate the
information, while in other instances they were not able
to do so. In the case in which the reader is able to locate
the correct referent, a large amount of processing effort
has been expended and, consequently, that reader
performs well on the recall task. If, however, the reader
spends processing time searching for a referent unsuc-
cessfully and treats the item as new information, two
differences in the results may be found. First, an unsuc-
cessful search for a referent may require less processing
time than a successful search, because the reader will not
need to make the bridging inference to the item and
will not relabel that item. Second, recall performance on
items involved in these unsuccessful search procedures
will be lower because the reader has not successfully
integrated the material across sentences. This explana-
tion could account for unexpected findings in the
indirect-far condition. In some instances, readers were
able to identify the referent (requiring greater amounts
of processing time and leading to higher recall), but in
other instances, the reader was not able to identify the
referent (requiring less processing time and leading to
lower recall), and the combination of these two differ-
ent strategies led to the intermediate level of the results
for the indirect-far condition as a whole. This explana-
tion of the recall results of the indirect-far condition
receives some support from the correlational data, for
it was this condition that had the strongest positive
correlation between reading time and correct gist recall.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The experiments reported here provide strong evi-
dence that qualitative differences in encoding processes
lead to different levels of recall of the information. In
both experiments, information that required more
processing to be correctly encoded was recalled more
frequently than that same information when it had been
correctly encoded with less processing. This was true
even when differences in the elaborateness of the mem-
ory trace were eliminated. The proposition that differ-
ent amounts or types of encoding processes affect the
retention and accessibility of structurally identical
memory traces as suggested by the original levels-of-
processing model (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and the
distinctiveness model (Jacoby & Craik, 1979) seems
valid.
This is not to suggest that either of these models
specifically supports or predicts the results obtained in
this study. Rather, it is a validation of the overall orien-
tation of the two models. With regard to the results of
this study, the distinctiveness model of Jacoby and
Craik (1979) specifically states that amount of process-
ing effort or number of processing steps is not a measure
of distinctiveness. However, both the distinctiveness
model and its earlier counterpart, the levels-of-processing
model, fail to identify any independent measure of
distinctiveness.
One possible shortcoming of the results of this study
lies in the interpretation of Anderson's (e.g., Anderson
& Reder, 1979; Bradshaw & Anderson, 1982) associa-
tive model of memory. According to our interpreta-
tion, the memory representations of a paragraph in the
direct-near or the direct-far condition would be identi-
cal. However, another interpretation of the model might
represent the two memory traces in such a way that the
traces would differ in amount of network redundancy.
As noted in the introduction, Anderson and Reder
(1979) state that increasing network redundancy will
also increase the probability of recall. In our view, this
caveat does not vitiate the findings of the research
reported here. It does, however, highlight the need for
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further research that investigates the possibility that
network redundancy will enhance recall performance.
The results of these experiments support recent work
on cognitive effort (e.g., Tyler et aI., 1979; Johnson-
Laird & Bethell-Fox, 1978). The work of these researchers
suggests that the amount of cognitive effort or process-
ing required to encode information determines how
readily that information will be recalled. However, most
of the research in this area has failed to control for
structural differences in the resulting memory trace
(such as elaboration) and have therefore failed to show
clear qualitative encoding effects. In addition, the
experiments in the current study, unlike most of the
earlier work in cognitive effort, have used methods that
are typical of the processes that occur in normal reading.
By showing that the difficulty involved in inferring or
finding the correct anaphoric relationship affects recall
performance, this study has shown that qualitative
encoding differences do affect the retention of textual
information.
However, these findings do not vitiate all of the
claims made by the elaboration theory. The claim that
elaborated representations lead to better recall seems
valid. If, on the other hand, the claim is that elaboration
explains all encoding effects on later recall, the elabora-
tion theory is overstated. We are suggesting that differ-
ent types or amounts of processing during encoding
affect later recall in two ways. First, the encoding
processes result in a more elaborated or quantitatively
larger memory representation. This could lead to better
recall due to either increased network or inferential
redundancy. Second, the additional amount or type of
processing results in qualitatively different memory
representations. This difference can be in the form of
trace strength, which is directly proportional to the
amount of encoding processing performed. Trace
strength, along with other variables such as elaborate-
ness of the memory representation and the retrieval
environment, would interact to determine the accessi-
bility of information for later recall.
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